Elaine Yao Receives the Best Article by a Non-Tenure Track Scholar Award from Formal Theory Section of APSA

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Elaine Yao Receives the Best Article by a Non-Tenure Track Scholar Award from Formal Theory Section of APSA


Assistant Professor Elaine Yao has received the Best Article by a Non-Tenure Scholar Award from the Formal Theory section of the American Political Science Association (APSA). 

Yao's article, titled, “Brook No Compromise: How to Negotiate a United Front," was published in the journal, American Journal of Political Science. The article examines negotiations in factional conflict, and utilizes a dynamic bargaining model to explore how the threat and usage of hardball tactics impact coordination in negotiations.

According to the Formal Theory section, the Best Article Award is "given to the author(s) of the best paper published in 2025 by a non-tenured scholar. To be eligible for this award, an article must have been published during 2025 and the recipient must not have tenure on the date the article is first published on a journal’s website."

Read the article's abstract below and the full article at the journal link above.

Abstract:

Negotiating factional conflict is crucial to successful coordination: Political parties, rebel alliances, and authoritarian elites must all overcome internal disagreements to survive and achieve collective aims. Actors in these situations sometimes employ hardball tactics to block outcomes they dislike, but at the risk of causing coordination failure. Using a dynamic bargaining model, I explore how the threat and usage of these tactics impact coordination. In the model, two players who prefer different reforms must jointly agree on one to overturn a mutually unfavorable status quo. Neither knows the other's willingness to compromise—whether they prefer the status quo over their less-preferred outcome. Players who are willing to compromise delay hardball, balancing incentives to preempt the opponent against the benefit of waiting to gather more information. Finally, I identify factors that incentivize players to exercise caution, thereby reducing the incidence of avoidable miscoordination, which results when players preemptively rule out possible compromises.